

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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## What U.S. Can Do in Middle East—I

by Georgiana G. Stevens

"There is no substitute for the application of work and local enterprise to each country's own resources. Help to those who have the will to help themselves should be the primary policy guiding and restraining the desire of the more developed areas of the world to help the less developed lands." So wrote the authors of the so-called Clapp report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East in 1949. It was on this basic principle of helping people to help themselves that the United States Point Four program was initiated in the Middle East in 1950. The late Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Point Four's first director, insisted on the need of requiring local governments to match American funds for this program. The Bennett theory was that only collaborative efforts between these governments and the advisers furnished by the Technical Cooperation Administration would bring the increased food production and distribution necessary to raise Middle East living standards.

This organic approach to development, involving persuasion and education rather than a shock-troop attack, followed and expanded an established pattern of aid in the Near East.

It was essentially an adaptation of missionary methods of teaching and demonstration, which had operated in the area for the past hundred years. The latter-day missionaries of Point Four would simply do under government auspices and on a wide scale what such organizations as the Near East colleges and the Near East Foundation had started. Thus, working on the theory that economic development requires social revolution through education, Point Four adopted the village welfare and agricultural demonstration of the Near East Foundation as its model for extensive services in Iran during the past year and a half. Similarly, by way of strengthening the administrative services of the Arab governments, Point Four has provided funds for the American University of Beirut to develop expanded programs of training in agriculture, engineering, preventive medicine and public administration. In Jordan an extension of existing facilities for agricultural training is being made possible in the same way.

All of these first steps in the TCA program were based on the original doctrine which stressed equal participation by Near East governments and their own technicians. It soon

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became apparent, however, during the last year's operations that in order to make a real change in their distressed and anemic economies, such countries as Lebanon and Jordan required more drastic intervention. Thus in Jordan some half million Palestine Arab refugees, who moved in four years ago, have created a series of economic crises requiring first aid. As a result about \$4 million of Point Four funds have been allocated for capital investments as well as services in Jordan. This fund, together with the counterpart funds supplied by Jordan, will speed the development of water resources and land reclamation and initiate health services and vocational training under the guidance of a newly formed Jordan Development Board. Small industries will be encouraged and subsidized in order to create employment opportunities.

### New Type of Aid

The emergency character of the crisis in Jordan has, in fact, called for shock treatment. It is important to realize, however, that these transfusions of capital now flowing into Jordan's economy represent a departure from the Point Four philosophy and the beginning of a new type of economic assistance in the Middle East. The idea of giving such direct economic aid followed the frustrating experiences of American technicians in trying to teach new agricultural skills to farmers who are too poor to afford modern tools. Moreover, it was apparent that irrigation and land reclamation schemes

to make the desert bloom could only be achieved by outside capital.

In order to help eliminate the lag between teaching and practice, therefore, proponents of economic aid asked from Congress and received last year \$160 million for technical and economic assistance to the Middle East in 1951-1952.

The subsequent appointment in November 1951 of Edwin A. Locke as President Truman's personal representative to administer this enlarged program signified a transformation of Point Four from an educational and welfare operation into one involving the supply of tractors and tools and the underwriting of construction projects. It was natural, therefore, that every Near East government which had up to that time been receptive to the modest offers of assistance from TCA should raise its sights in expectation of financial aid as well.

The ensuing necessity for Mr. Locke's office, of choosing among local projects those most likely to benefit the entire population, has meant inevitable involvement in internal politics. Under existing conditions of political disturbance in the Arab countries the struggle of those in power to use American aid to fortify their threatened positions clashes sharply with the aims of a large educated minority bent on reform of unequal tax and landholding systems. Hence the choices open to a would-be benefactor nation are (1) to help those in power remain there, (2) to encourage revolt by aiding the reformers, or (3) to super-

vise all projects undertaken with American funds. A fourth alternative, advocated by the Point Four purists, is to stick to fundamental technical education and welfare services and avoid economic and political entanglements. This school of thought maintains that lasting results will not be obtained by methods of artificial respiration and that the unwise distribution of money for short-term symbolic improvements will only further complicate the strained relations between the Iranians and the Arabs on the one hand and the United States on the other.

At the heart of this problem is the issue of how far bilateral aid agreements should involve the United States in the internal affairs of those receiving assistance. Advocates of short-term measures to improve local conditions in a country such as Lebanon, for example, are impelled by the conviction that extreme economic weakness makes that country increasingly vulnerable to Communist propaganda. They are willing to risk building a dam or two in the hope that such construction will actually benefit the farmers rather than the few industrialists. By the same token they hope that the actual benefits will outweigh the accusations of imperialism directed at them by both supernaturalists and Communists.

(This is the first part of an article on United States aid to the Middle East. The second part will be printed in the July 15 FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Mrs. Stevens, a political analyst in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, has recently returned from a visit to the Middle East.)

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## The Role of Air Power

The belief that a nation can secure itself from attack or win victory in war through air power alone has attracted many distinguished supporters over the years. If this belief were true, the cost of defense and war could be reduced, not so much in monetary terms but in terms of human life and of strain on the national economic organization, for then the range of items produced for military use would be specialized and limited. Winston Churchill toyed with the idea of victory through air power during World War II, when the enthusiastic Air Marshal Sir Arthur Travers Harris was confident that the Nazis could be overcome from the sky. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur seemed to give some credence to the efficacy of air power when he was still supreme commander in Korea in 1951.

### Eisenhower and Taft

While World War II showed that air power is indispensable to victory in modern war, no nation has yet entrusted its security entirely to this weapon. Navies and land armies strong in relation to air forces remain important components of the military establishments of the major powers. In the United States, however, the controversy over air power has not been settled. It is currently an issue between the two principal candidates for the Republican presidential nomination, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Robert A. Taft.

Senator Taft introduced the air power question into the political campaign in a twofold statement on June 1. First, he blamed the Truman Administration for a "steady deteriora-

tion" in American air power. This deterioration, he said, has left the American Air Force at such a disadvantage compared with the Communist nations that the Korean war can not be won "until many months of improvement in our air power." Secondly, he advocated the development of American air power at the expense of land and sea forces. The Senator attaches so much importance to air power that in his presentation it almost becomes a substitute for foreign policy. Through air power, he contends, the United States could make itself secure without the help of our fellow members in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Of course," said the Senator, "we desire" the West Europeans "as our allies," but "we must not admit that our safety depends on" them.

General Eisenhower took issue with Taft at his Washington press conference on June 3. "If there is anyone who feels the ordinary foot soldier can be displaced," he said, "I wish he would show me how to do it." He reminded the press that he had encouraged the establishment of a separate air force, which has been functioning since 1947, and believes in "air power" but not to the exclusion of other sources of military power. While the two Republican candidates in effect debated the future role of American air power, President Truman on June 7 contested Taft's claim that American air power was declining. The United States has "clear superiority" in the air over Korea, Truman declared. "A big powerful air force is an absolute necessity, and we are going to have one." But he described as "nonsense" Taft's opinion that air

power is the key to our security.

Neither President Truman nor General Eisenhower could take any other attitude toward Senator Taft's claims for air power without repudiating the foreign policy with which they have both been associated. An important feature of this policy is action to deter aggressive powers from invading Western Europe. In this context the United States has encouraged the Europeans to build up their own land forces and has assigned land troops to Europe.

### Air Power and Foreign Policy

Despite the strong theoretical arguments of the air power enthusiasts, the deterrent power of an air force lacking heavy ground support is yet to be demonstrated. A change-over in military policy at the present time could raise doubts among Europeans as to whether the United States remained seriously interested in deterring the advance of an aggressor who might occupy their territories. The change would be all the more risky because there may be some basis for Taft's charge of "deterioration" (although Taft himself has voted to reduce air appropriations). While the American air force has grown from 55 to 91 wings in four years, its relative power has apparently declined, owing to the swifter expansion of Soviet air power. The atomic bomb, the chief weapon in contemporary theoretical air strategy, is itself losing its usefulness to the United States because the B-36, the plane developed to carry the bomb to its target, has not lived up to expectations, its engines now being regarded as inadequate for its mission.

BLAIR BOLLES



## What Makes Communists?

The decision of Premier Antoine Pinay's government to crack down on French Communist leaders who tried to stir up agitation against the Bonn accord and the arrival in France of General Matthew B. Ridgway, General Eisenhower's successor as SHAPE commander, and the disillusionment aroused in India by the tactics of newly elected Communist deputies have led some Western observers to assume that communism, having passed its zenith, will henceforth retreat before the advance of democracy.

There is no doubt that the Kremlin's postwar use of Communist movements in other countries to realize the objectives of Russia as a national state has alienated non-Russian Communist leaders who had once looked to Moscow for aid and guidance in the fulfillment of the programs they believed necessary in their own countries. Of this alienation the Yugoslav Communist party is the most striking example.

### Yugoslavia's Experience

But if Yugoslavia is to be taken as a preview of what may happen in other areas where Communists have shown strength, then disaffection from Moscow does not necessarily spell the end of attachment to communism. On the contrary, the Yugoslav Communist leaders, once liberated from the Kremlin's directives, have displayed an intense interest in going back to the original sources of Communist thought—Marx and Engels—unpolluted, as they see it, by its Lenin-Stalin transliteration into Russian terms. Yugoslavia's experience emphasizes anew the question not yet satisfactorily answered:

What makes Communists? Is it Russian propaganda implemented by funds from the Kremlin? Is it the conspiracy of native Communist leaders indebted in one way or another to Moscow? Is it dissatisfaction with existing conditions on the part of some groups of the population who see no way of achieving change except through resort to the Communist party?

Again, there is little doubt that the coming to power of the Russian Communists in 1917, with the resources of a great nation at their disposal, strengthened and heartened Communists throughout the world. The non-Russian Communists, believing in the international character of the Communist movement, expected that Russia's power would be used to advance the interests of Communist parties in other lands. In some instances this expectation was realized. In others Russia's Communist leaders, while not abandoning the ultimate goal of world communism, followed policies designed to assure the survival of the Russian "fatherland" rather than of communism elsewhere. And on many occasions the Kremlin has not hesitated to cast aside non-Russian Communists, no matter how closely linked to Moscow in the past, whenever this seemed desirable to achieve its world objectives.

The course followed by the Soviet government has shown again and again that neither the Russian Communist party nor the world Communist movement are as monolithic and united as they are often believed to be by non-Communists. Since the days of Lenin innumerable fissures have appeared in the seem-

ingly granite surface of communism. Moreover, the challenge of communism has needed non-Communist governments into taking measures for economic and social improvement which might otherwise have been much longer in coming if they had come at all. Why is it, then, that communism has remained a significant rallying-point not only in underdeveloped areas unfamiliar with democratic traditions but in such centers of Western civilization as France and Italy?

### 'Social Communism'

One answer has been given by the independent French monthly, *Réalités*, which conducted a poll this year to find out why more than 5 million Frenchmen vote Communist. Its conclusion is that these 5 million vote Communist essentially "because they want a qualified and energetic champion of their interests who will help them to improve their material condition." A majority of the French Communist voters "are attached to parliamentary institutions and democratic liberties. . . . The U.S.S.R. irritates them somewhat although they feel a vague sympathy for it. . . . They are rather anti-American. . . . The majority of Communist voters prefer the way of reforms to revolution."

A similar interpretation of why many Italians vote Communist was given in the liberal Catholic magazine, *The Commonweal*, in July 1951. A distinction, said this analysis, is drawn by Italians between what they call "social communism" and "political communism." "Social communism" arises from chronic

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## Perón and the United States

by Thomas F. McGann

Dr. McGann, teaching fellow in history at Harvard University, has lived in Argentina during and since Perón's rise to power. He is the author of articles in *Inter-American Economic Affairs* and the *Hispanic-American Historical Review*, and a collaborator in other publications concerning Latin America.

"In the end we all need each other—and there is no small enemy." This sentence can be found in a recent copy of *Epoca*, one of the important Perón newspapers in Buenos Aires. In its context this is not the comment of some spokesman for the unity of the free world; it is an indirect threat to the United States. General Perón understands that a small nation may today take an authoritative hand with the titans in the game of cold war, and perhaps, some day, even in a hot war; he knows, out of the lessons his shrewd mind reads from the history of applied state power, that a dictator may travel far on nerve. And he appreciates that the salvation of his regime from internal economic chaos depends in part on the world situation and on the way he uses his few cards in that game.

Economic difficulties at home may save Perón the trouble of indulging in international politics—of hunting through the hemisphere for Yankee weak points to bolster his own strength. Early in his first six-year administration, which ends this spring, Perón achieved considerable success in nationalizing public utilities, expanding light industry, selling food to a hungry world, and increasing the living standard of Argentine workers. By 1949 the ramifications of these policies and changing world conditions began to dim the bright domestic scene he had set. But then came a loan of \$125 million from the United States and the Korean war, and Argentina's sagging economy revived. Today those stimulants

have worn off, and the patient is all the more conscious of besetting ills.

### Economic Danger Signals

Despite the ceaseless claims of Perón and his press, the Argentine disease is not inflation caused by a handful of malevolent Argentine profiteers and by the imperialistic democracies. It is the dislocation of the economic structure of the nation by a corrupt, inept totalitarian regime. Perón and his planners, many of whom are Nazis, Fascists and Falangists from Europe, have severely twisted the Argentine economy, which has long been rich in human and physical resources. The government itself admits to a rise of 455 percent in the cost of living since 1943. Small shopkeepers at the end of the day close their tills on \$1,000 peso-notes that they rarely saw in the pre-Perón era. The amount of currency in circulation and the internal national debt have increased vastly in the past six years. But there are more important tests of the economic danger. This year for the first time in more than two generations Argentina may not have wheat for export. And the 5 million inhabitants of greater Buenos Aires, surrounded by the world's most fertile soil, suffer shortages of meat, milk, butter and other staples.

Behind such surprising facts stand the rulers of Argentina, who have for nearly a decade worked to achieve autarchy. They have worked to make the country politically obedient, industrially more independent and militarily powerful in order that

Argentina may attain a stronger position in South America and beyond. This goal Perón will not long forsake: to do so would be to abandon the premises upon which he rose to power and by which he rules. He cannot surrender, but he can retreat, at least in the sphere of economic planning, and this he is presently attempting.

In an effort to recover international trading strength, he is seeking to recoup agricultural losses brought about by his disregard for the interests of the cattlemen and farmers. On February 19, 1952 he proclaimed a 27-point program promising to mechanize agriculture, encourage livestock production, suppress government subsidies and revise upward the prices paid to producers by the government. At the same time he promises to raise wages, stabilize prices and ration scarce items. This is Perón's "austerity" program. It has already led to a multitude of decisions, but few solutions. It has also led to such curious sights as the president's personal inspection of receptacles for waste table-food on the valid plea that the Argentine people, at least many in Buenos Aires, throw away as much food after a meal as is eaten in a day in other parts of the world. Another surprising testimonial to Argentina's difficulties is the fact that the *porteños*—the residents of Buenos Aires—are now obliged to do without meat two days a week, when once they ate at one sitting an Englishman's weekly ration.

The well-fed Argentines are perhaps the world's poorest austerity

risks. Perón realizes this; and it may be expected that he will at last seriously combat the agricultural crisis, not only as an economic threat but because of its political implications. Argentina's urban workers have been aroused by Perón himself to knowledge of their power and the tactics of its use. He knows that the next revolution in Argentina may be more than a garrison mutiny arranged by telephone.

### U.S. the Scapegoat

It is this possibility that may lead Perón to expand his already active role in external politics. His need for issues to divert his people coincides with the philosophy of state expansion upon which his rule rests. Here the United States is both his obstacle and his scapegoat; hence the general's sustained, vicious propaganda attack upon this country—an attack that follows straight down the Leninist imperialist line. The “Yankee imperialist of Wall Street” is today scarcely less well-known to the people of Argentina than to the people of Russia. Ever since 1945 Perón has libeled and slandered some of our accredited representatives to Argentina—without, it should be added, any known reproof from our own government. Our modest stock of good will among the Argentine people is fast being dissipated.

While he pushes his antidemocratic offensive, Perón spreads his doctrines of *justicialismo* and the “third position,” between capitalism and communism. Inadequate as these dogmas are, they serve Perón well. Behind the smoke screen which they generate he manipulates his totalitarian machinery—not to the complete dissatisfaction of the Communists, who, although sporadically persecuted, find much comfort in a man who has aroused a class conflict, undermined private enterprise, at-

tacked the United States, and is sufficiently supple to stretch the distance from his right to his left should circumstances ever demand.

Behind Perón's colossal opportunism lies a determination to whittle down United States influence in Latin America, substituting for it that of Argentina. This effort takes several forms. The first is traditional in Argentine-United States relations: heel-dragging by Argentina within the Organization of American States. Argentina has always been the champion noncollaborator in Pan American affairs. There is no reason to believe that Perón will do more than join verbally in any collective action, unless the danger is desperate or the price high. The Argentine government has already given proof that it distrusts the mild military cooperation envisaged by the Inter-American Defense Board more than it fears any military threat from outside the hemisphere.

This antagonism is even clearer with respect to the consultations now in progress between the United States and many Latin American governments under the Mutual Security Act. It is not publicly known whether or not the Argentine government received a bid to participate in that program, but judging from the angry reactions of the Argentine government, which sees its neighbors, Uruguay and Chile, engaged in military conversations with the United States, the offer either has not been made or the terms were unacceptable to Perón. It is doubtful if Perón would refuse arms if he could see his way clear to maintaining at the same time his anti-United States, hypernationalistic position. American military collaboration with Argentina therefore depends to a large degree on the willingness of the United States government to placate Perón, as it did in the case

of the \$125 million loan which Washington kindly described as a “credit” in order to save face for the Argentine leader, who had publicly shouted that he would cut off his right hand before his government would accept a loan from the United States.

Our military relations with Perón turn on an estimate of Argentina's importance in world strategy. The chief value of Argentina in any future conflict would probably be its historic role as a supplier of foodstuffs. Great as is its production of such commodities, the United States can replace them by increased production at home or in other regions geographically and ideologically closer to this country. To assume that Argentine products are vital to a future victory is to shoulder the burden of protecting extremely long sea lanes from Argentina to the consuming centers of the free world. The undertaking is not commensurate with any present need.

The use of the Straits of Magellan in the event of the closure of the Panama Canal is in part dependent upon the cooperation of the Argentine government. But the trip around Cape Horn has been made before; and if the time should come when the United States has lost the use of the Canal, there is little reason to believe that we would not exact a quick agreement from Perón for the passage of the eastern reaches of the Straits.

### Argentine Isolationism

To expect aid from the Argentine army is to contradict Argentine history. Argentine isolationism can hold its own with the best that the United States had to offer 20 years ago. Immediately after the outbreak of the Korean war, General Perón felt obliged to assure his people that their army would never fight outside



Argentina. Indeed, the United Nations forces in Korea have yet to receive the shipload of meat that Perón promised them in 1950. To point up Argentine feeling toward collective military agreements the Buenos Aires newspaper columnist "Descartes," who many say is Perón himself, recently described the Mutual Security Act as a United States plan to obtain "Latin American cannon fodder." In the face of such evidence the expenditure of time, money or supplies in a military alliance with Argentina is likely to be disproportionate to any gain. Indeed, such negotiations would result in a further diminution of our shrinking democratic reputation, not only among the friends we still have in Argentina, but throughout Latin America.

Temporarily an outcast from the military race now under way in Latin America (although this does not mean that his armed strength will be exceeded by that of any nation in Latin America), Perón has resorted to other and perhaps more efficacious means of building Argentine strength in the hemisphere at the expense of the United States. He has just established in Buenos Aires a Latin American Committee of Syndicalist Unity to carry the message of his "justicialist" regime into the other American states. The organizational meeting of this "third labor force" was held in Paraguay, with citizens of several Latin American countries attending, thus at once demonstrating Argentina's international ambitions and Perón's tight rein over his landlocked neighbor.

This is the latest and most overt step in a sustained attempt to win the interest of Latin American workers for Perón's "labor state." Perón is also flooding the capitals of the hemisphere with propaganda depicting the achievements of his government and attacking the sinister in-

tentions of the American government and American labor organizations. Argentine "labor attachés" have been stationed in Latin American capitals to supervise this campaign and to implement it with advice, promises and free trips to Buenos Aires for willing labor leaders. Perón's representative in Panama has been one of the most active of these attachés.

Although the importance of this foreign agitation remains to be seen, there can be little doubt that at home Perón has faithfully executed the doctrine of the third position, if only in the sense that he faces in two directions at the same time. Political opposition is merely verbally in existence—and that voice weakens daily. The efficient Federal police silence criticism not already drowned out by an obedient Congress, press and radio. Perón has carefully cultivated the pre-Perón weaknesses of the Argentine party system, and so efficient is his usually gloved but heavy hand that there is little indication of any important organized opposition capable of replacing the dictatorship.

### Accent on Sovereignty

Perón runs Argentina's foreign affairs exclusively for the national interest, as he sees it. In this he is true to one of the most powerful traditions in his country's history—neutrality. It has been the way of Argentine governments, although not of many Argentines, to think first of national interests and then to keep thinking of them while the world outside takes its course. This policy worked well through two world wars, despite Cordell Hull's efforts to force a reversal in the heat of World War II. It worked after the defeat of the Fascist states in 1945, although Perón was obliged to walk his totalitarian path with

some discretion for a short time. And if there is any estimate to be made of the tightening situation in Argentina today, it is that Perón will place what he considers to be untrammelled national sovereignty above any call to join in the defense of the free world. In a crisis involving Argentina's external policy Perón can probably count on the support of a large majority of his people. Even those who hate him admit to his charismatic power, nowhere more useful to him than when he calls upon Argentines to display their ingrained faith in their independence from the fate of the world.

The world situation is not wholly unfavorable to *peronista* successes, provided the Leader can master his economic problems. The suddenly too visible collapse of Britain's world authority has jarred the political seismographs in Buenos Aires as well as in Cairo and Teheran. Perón is busy taking readings and estimating the shape of the future world edifice. Nothing is more reasonable, therefore, than the appearance on the stage of history of that strange team, Mossadeh and Perón, one with oil to sell, the other with the world's newest tankers in which to transport it. Nor is there anything unreasonable in the possibility that an unchained Germany may some day find in Argentina an old associate whose economy is complementary and whose political beliefs are not unfamiliar to Germans.

Perón has restrained his ultranationalistic supporters in recent years while tending to his domestic program; but such organizations as the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista, which was decisive in Perón's struggle for the presidency, have long chafed at the bonds he has placed upon them. The force of nationalism is as available for tapping in Latin America as in Asia, and in

no place has it a greater potential than in Argentina. There it has not only the negative program of anti-Americanism but also a positive creed: reconstitution of the Spanish Empire's viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which embraced Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay and Argentina. The prospect has economic as well as political appeal for Perón and his circle and for many Argentines not otherwise in sympathy with the dictator. It is a program for a dictatorship with a large, unemployed army. It assumes a nation imbued with the spirit of *realpolitik*, unconstrained by any strong neighbor and considering itself free of international responsibility. It is a program for a government hostile to hemispheric cooperation and perhaps expectant of the day when the most powerful state in the Americas is fully occupied elsewhere.

In an unguarded moment in 1943 Perón told a Chilean newspaper: "We of the Argentine army are playing a dangerous game. We will not tolerate impositions of an international order and much less of an internal order." The game has grown larger since that time, but Perón will play it to the end.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Robert J. Alexander, *The Perón Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951); Joe C. Ashby, "Labor and the Philosophy of the Argentine Revolution," *Inter-American Eco-*

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## Dean

(Continued from page 4)

misery and demoralizing unemployment. It expresses the longing for a change, whatever it may be, among people living in conditions which could not be worse. They have nothing to lose and everything to win. . . . The great majority of Italian Communists are 'social Communists' and will remain so as long as there are 2 million permanently unemployed."

If these interpretations are correct, then the jailing of Communist leaders, or the outlawing of Communist parties in France and Italy, or even the overthrow of the Communist government in Moscow would not automatically eradicate the local conditions which began to foster Communist movements in Western Europe half a century before Lenin and Stalin appeared on the world scene. *Réalités*, on the basis of its poll, reaches the conclusion that even if Communists should be disappointed in Russia and persuaded of "in-

ternal contradictions" among their local leaders, "it is not certain that this would suffice to make them vote differently if at the same time they did not see elsewhere a better chance of having their interests defended and their situation improved."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## FPA Bookshelf

### PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

*The Price of Revolution*, by D. W. Brogan. New York, Harper, 1952. \$3.50.

The British political scientist, well-known for his previous writings on the American character, with his usual wit and erudition analyzes the high cost of revolutions, including that of 1776. He offers no practical suggestions, however, as to the methods that peoples who do not have Britain's parliamentary institutions and democratic traditions might use to alter conditions regarded as intolerable.

*Two Cheers for Democracy*, by E. M. Forster. New York, Harcourt, 1951. \$4.

This collection of essays by the author of *A Passage to India* is a thoughtful inquiry into the many woes besetting modern civilization. It is a humanist message which gives two cheers for democracy: "One because it admits variety, and two because it permits criticism. Two cheers are quite enough: there is no occasion to give three."

*The Fear of Freedom*, by Francis Biddle. New York, Doubleday, 1951. \$3.50.

A searching analysis of the various encroachments on freedom in the United States inspired by fear of communism, in which Mr. Biddle, former United States Attorney General, eloquently calls for reassertion of the American belief in freedom of the spirit.

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